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  2Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
 
The primary obstacle to clandestine and unlawful nuclear weapon production is to get 
access to sufficient quantities and qualities of fissile material. Highly enriched uranium or 
plutonium is the essential components of any nuclear explosive device. It is considerably 
easier to make a bomb using enriched uranium than using plutonium.
2 Potential 
proliferators could therefore try to divert uranium material directly from any weapons-
usable source, e.g. from the naval fuel cycle, due to the extremely high enrichment levels 
and low radiation levels.
3 Highly enriched naval fuel cycles may thus serve as a back 
door for production of clandestine nuclear weapons. 
To increase confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel and to support contemporary 
nuclear arms control efforts, this report suggests a set of transparency measures that could 
be introduced on stockpiles of naval fissile material. Particular attention will be given to 
U.S. and Russian naval fuel stocks, as these are by far the most extensive in the world. 
The U.S. and Russia are nuclear weapon states and their fissile material is therefore not 
subjected to safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
4  
As international nuclear arms control stands poised to move beyond agreements limiting 
strategic delivery systems, and the international community tries to shrink the noose 
around all stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material, they will, sooner or later 
encounter the stocks of highly enriched uranium destined for naval nuclear prolusion 
purposes.
5 Moreover, as Russia is currently evolving plans for the construction and 
possible export of floating nuclear power plants, using reactors fuel with HEU, new 
markets for HEU outside international control could, emerge. If this fuel has been 
enriched to 90 % or higher, as low as 10 fuel assemblies could supply enough highly 
enriched uranium for a bomb.
6 Yet, the level of international control and transparency on 
these large and highly proliferation-attractive stockpiles is strikingly low. 
The report identifies ways to increase transparency in the naval fuel cycle without 
conflicting with national security needs or concerns, and argues that such transparency 
  3measures will give long-term nuclear security benefits. The report is divided into five 
chapters and two appendixes. Following this introductory chapter, the next chapter 
provides a general background on fissile material transparency, including definitions, 
recent political transparency commitments, and a discussion of obstacles to transparency, 
both of a justified and of unjustified character. Chapter 3 deals with the current 
transparency situation – or more correctly, the lack of such measures – regarding naval 
fuel cycles, both in nuclear weapon states and in non-nuclear weapon states. Chapter 4 
suggests a set of transparency components that could be acceptable to the possessors of 
nuclear submarines, as a foundation for a voluntary naval fuel transparency regime.  
 
Conclusions and recommendations for the implementation of the proposed transparency 
components are given in Chapter 5. Appendix I provides an analysis of current and future 
naval fuel consumption levels in the U.S. and Russia, and technical background 
information on the fuel. The analysis shows that existing naval fuel stockpiles in the two 
states are substantial and that their fuel needs in the future are diminishing. This could 
ease the political process of introducing transparency on the highly sensitive naval fuel 
cycles. In appendix II, the proliferation potential of naval fuel is discussed, including an 
assessment of the challenges associated with using naval HEU fuel as the fissionable 
explosives of crude nuclear devices. This assessment is presented to underline the need 
for increased international focus on all HEU naval fuel cycles, with a future international 
naval fuel transparency norm as the ultimate goal.  
 
Throughout the text, the term “transparency” is used to cover voluntary measures 
initiated by the individual state(s) to increase international confidence in non-diversion of 
naval fuel for nuclear explosive purposes.  
 
 
 
 
   
  4Chapter 2: Why fissile material transparency? 
 
While existing arms control agreements do not include any restrictions on the stockpiles 
of fissile material, the stocks of fissile material place a de facto upper limit on the number 
of warheads that can be produced. Today there is no requirement to eliminate any nuclear 
warheads: current agreements only require elimination of delivery systems and put limits 
on the number of warheads each can carry. The existence of large stockpiles of fissile 
material will create a potential for rapid and large-scale “breakouts” from treaty 
obligations. Thus, if military nuclear arms reductions are to be made permanent, more 
information will have to be made available about all military stocks of fissile material, 
and steps must be taken to reduce these stocks so that they cannot be easily re-introduced 
into nuclear weapon assemblies or used in crude nuclear explosive devises. 
 
Fissile material transparency is therefore likely to become an increasingly important tool 
for addressing both arms control and nonproliferation issues in the coming decades.
7 
Accurate information on the stocks of fissile material is prerequisite for gaining control 
of and confidence in non-diversion of the material. The considerable uncertainties in 
fissile material inventories could in fact prove to be the largest obstacle for verifying 
nuclear disarmament.
8 International transparency of fuel stocks, while protecting 
proliferation sensitive information, is therefore likely to support both global 
nonproliferation efforts and the long-term security interests of Russia and the United 
States.
9 
 
Until recently, it was assumed that information on plutonium and HEU stocks should be 
available only to governments, industrial companies and international agencies. In most 
countries that possess nuclear weapons or that are trying to acquire them, information 
about HEU and plutonium production is still classified. The latter part of the past decade 
has seen a political shift and there is now widespread agreement that greater transparency 
is a desirable goal.
10  
  5This is reflected both in bilateral transparency commitments and the voluntary stockpile 
declarations put forward by some of the nuclear weapon states, notably the U.S. and the 
U.K. 
 
More information is now available about military nuclear programs than only a few years 
ago, but still there exist no official figures on the military inventories of HEU in the 
nuclear weapon states.
11 U.S. estimates of the size of the Russian fissile material 
stockpile have an uncertainty factor of more than a hundred tons.
12 Moreover, hardly any 
of the measures necessary to verifiably reduce stockpile of nuclear warheads and fissile 
material to low, agreed levels are in place. These are measures that will have to be 
developed by the states with the largest stockpiles: the United States and Russia.
13 
 
Once introduced and in place, transparency measures could have a self-intensifying 
effect. Voluntary measures will generate increased confidence in the peaceful (non-
offensive) nuclear intentions of the adversary, reducing tensions and the perceived need 
for secrecy. It is to be hoped that they will create a climate of new declaration and 
openness, producing a positive response to the disarmament and nonproliferation 
processes.
 The goal of confidence building is to release information through transparency 
activities that can corroborate that no clandestine activities are taking place, bolster the 
validity of material accounting, confirm that nuclear material is adequately protected, and 
verify that nonproliferation obligations are being met. 
 
Thus there exist several interrelated incentives for increased transparency on all stocks of 
fissile materials, including materials destined for naval nuclear propulsion:  
–  to gain confidence in non-diversion, 
–   to maintain constructive security dialogues,  
–  to raise awareness of international nonproliferation challenges, and  
–  to identify the best and most sustainable nuclear security options. 
 
The meaning of transparency 
 
  6“Transparency” could be understood as measures that provide confidence that a activity is 
taking place. “Verification”, however, could be understood as measures that confirm that 
a activity is actually taking place. For arms control, transparency involves for instance 
measures that build the confidence of each side in its understanding of the size of the 
other’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile material, and the rate of reduction of 
these stockpiles.
14 Implementing international verification and transparency measures 
will not necessarily be the same as applying IAEA safeguards, though some of the 
measures (e.g. declarations) and techniques employed may have common features.
15 
 
Nuclear weapons states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty have an obligation not to 
disseminate sensitive nuclear information to non-nuclear weapon states.
16 However, the 
internationally most credible way of preventing clandestine and unlawful use of 
plutonium or uranium is to place surplus stocks under international or bilateral 
surveillance. Thus, the major incentive for promoting transparency on existing stocks of 
fissile material is not primarily to supply security to the material itself (which may be 
adequate in most nuclear weapon states), but to reassure the international community that 
the material will not be diverted to other uses. 
 
Transparency itself will necessarily be a dynamic process, dependent on the audience, the 
timing requirements of the activities, the location of the effort (country or facility where 
activity takes place) and changes in the international environment.
17 Also culture will 
have an impact on transparency, as cultural characteristics and beliefs will affect how it is 
interpreted. Bearing in mind the different dynamics of interrelationships, one could 
define transparency as a: “.... cooperative process that is based on thorough risk-benefit 
assessments and that (1) increases openness and builds confidence, (2) promotes mutual 
trust and working relationships among countries, national and international agencies, and 
the public, and (3) facilitates verification and monitoring measures by information 
exchanges.”
18 
 
Thus, transparency is more than a description of a nuclear program or a specific site. 
Based on voluntary measures, it permits the accumulation of data, both direct and 
  7indirect, over an extensive period of time to build confidence that behavior of a country 
or a group of countries is consistent with agreements and norms. Transparency surpasses 
such required activities as reporting to regulatory bodies. Transparency has been aptly 
described as “permitted knowledge”.
19 The voluntary release of information is the true 
measure of transparency. Moreover, taking extra steps of openness beyond expectations 
will promote even higher levels of trust. 
 
Political transparency commitments  
 
With the end of the Cold War have come substantial changes in how nuclear powers view 
their stockpiles of weapons and their stocks of fissile material. There appears to be a 
growing willingness on the part of most of the established nuclear powers to reduce the 
sizes of their stockpiles and to use the excess material for peaceful energy production, or 
to provide for their ultimate disposal under stringent safeguards.
20 
 
As a part of this process, the United States and Russia have launched several bilateral 
nuclear warhead and material transparency efforts. The first of these was launched at the 
January 1994 summit when the presidents of both countries agreed on a goal of “ensuring 
the transparency and irreversibility of the process of reduction of nuclear weapons.” The 
initiative, dubbed the "Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI)" initiative, was 
designed largely to ensure that fissile material from eliminated warheads would not be 
recycled into new weapons.
21  
 
Despite the good intentions and practical work (such as working groups for spot checks 
to increase confidence in fissile material declarations, and mutual reciprocal inspections) 
the STI initiative collapsed when the two countries could not commit themselves to an 
agreement that would allow the cooperative exchange of sensitive and classified 
information.
22 All the same, interest in political transparency remained alive, and the 
issue was resurrected at the March 1997 Presidential Summit in Helsinki when Presidents 
Yeltsin and Clinton agreed that the proposed START III agreement would include 
transparency measures.
23  
  8 
Moreover, as part of the U.S. Openness Initiative, the Department of Energy released a 
report on plutonium production, acquisition, and utilization in the U.S. from 1944 
through 1994.
24 The United States is expected to release similar information on its HEU 
stockpile and use in the near future. The extensive production of uranium and the 
complexity of the uranium fuel cycle render such assessment more challenging than the 
plutonium account.
25 The intentions behind the 1996 plutonium report were to aid in 
discussions of plutonium storage, safety and security with stakeholders, as well as to 
encourage other nations to declassify and release similar data.
26  
 
Unfortunately, Russia has not released any official information on its fissile material 
stockpiles. Russian officials and laboratory experts have indicated that the country lacks 
the funds for compiling such information in a format comparable to that used by the 
United States concerning its plutonium stockpile. This has led to a proposed lab-to-lab 
contract, whereby the United States would undertake to pay the cost of preparing an 
inventory of Russia’s plutonium stockpile in return for receiving information at the same 
level of detail as that already released by the U.S. 
27 
 
Obstacles to transparency 
 
At first glance, transparency and security may seem like incompatible and conflicting 
interests: it may be argued that any openness is likely to harm the long-term security 
interests of a nation due to its loss of control of information. Transparency measures 
could introduce the risk that classified, sensitive or proprietary information might be 
compromised or released – with adverse impacts on national security and international 
obligations.
28 Apart from the proliferation risks, this may increase vulnerability and 
lessen the (political) strength of the nation, as sensitive technical information and 
weaknesses could be revealed. Moreover, increased openness could make it easier for 
criminals and sub-national groups to divert fissile material unlawfully, if government 
details of the physical protection systems and quantities and qualities of fissile material at 
facilities were to be made available.  
 
  9Some of the objections to transparency are clearly well founded and justified, based on 
proliferation risks. Others, however, may be outdated and based more on traditions of 
“instinctive” secrecy. Secretiveness has traditionally had a special status within nuclear 
weapon complexes. Divulging technical information has been seen as being on a par with 
the surrender of status, and has often been viewed as defeat.
29 
 
Some guidelines would seem necessary to facilitate the delicate processes of 
transparency. For one thing, a transparency measure should generally not release 
information that could be damaging to the very nonproliferation interests it seeks to 
promote. Thus, detailed information concerning sensitive nuclear technology and 
physical protection of the material at each facility should not be released. Also industrial 
and proprietary rights could be harmed by far-reaching transparency (e.g. at sites with 
cutting-edge MPC&A – Material Protection, Control and Accounting – technology), and 
should be protected to the extent possible. Normally, domestic and international 
agreements and laws, derived from sensitive nuclear technology and physical protection 
requirements, have been established to prevent the dissipation of both sensitive 
information and information containing proprietary secrets. 
 
Moreover, practical limitations may hamper the introduction of transparency measures. 
Companies already contractors at one or more sites would want to stay in control of their 
technology and maintain a competitive edge. Nor should one underestimate the costs and 
possible impact on the operation of the facility that introducing transparency through 
monitoring could involve. Indeed, it would seem that the more transparency that is 
requested, the greater the cost.
30  
 
If transparency measures are to proceed and gain momentum, all these factors must be 
dealt with in ways specifically designed for that purpose. While the technology applied 
may limit the negative impacts of increased insight (e.g. by the introduction of 
verification with information barriers), traditional secrecy could prove to be the most 
transparency-resistant obstacle, just as it has blocked the progress of joint U.S.–Russian 
security upgrades of Russia’s fissile material.  
  10Chapter 3: The naval fuel cycle and the lack of transparency  
 
All the five declared nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty possess 
nuclear-propelled submarines. However, as nuclear weapon states, they are all exempted 
from international (IAEA) safeguards and other monitoring activities.
31 Sensitivity issues 
and the strategic importance of nuclear submarines have led the nuclear weapon states to 
maintain a high degree of secrecy around their own nuclear naval operations. Very little 
is officially known about U.S. and Russian submarine nuclear fuel designs, production 
technology, operational data and naval fuel stocks.
32  
 
The lack of transparency on the U.S. naval fuel cycle  
 
No official figures exist on the U.S. stockpiles of HEU for naval purposes or material 
destined for future naval consumption. Estimates indicate an overall consumption of 
HEU in U.S. reactors since the dawn of nuclear propulsion of approximately 120 tons – 
some 12% of the total U.S. HEU production of nearly 1,000 tons.
33  
 
As the U.S. has stopped enriching HEU, the U.S. Navy relies solely on weapon stocks of 
HEU for its naval propulsion program. While this may complicate any introduction of 
transparency measures, portions of the U.S. HEU stockpile are already subject to somoe 
international verification: As part of its fissile material cut-off initiative launched in 1993, 
the Clinton Administration offered to allow the IAEA to inspect about 10 tons of HEU at 
the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge in 1994.
34 Furthermore, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment 
to irreversibility and the nuclear disarmament process, President Clinton announced in 
March 1995 that another 200 tons of fissile material would be permanently withdrawn 
from the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile. Of this material, 173.4 tons is HEU, in many 
chemical forms.
35  
 
Still, there is only 12 tons of excess fissile material under international safeguards at three 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities.
36 In addition, approximately 50 tons of 
excess HEU were being down-blended at an NRC-licensed
37 facility under international 
  11safeguards.
38 These down-blending operations began late 1999 and will continue for six 
years. However, none of the material currently placed under international safeguards is 
designated or suitable for the naval fuel cycle.  
 
In fact, the U.S. Navy has been proceeding with extreme caution, keeping in military 
reserve all the fissile material usable for naval propulsion. The low proportion of higher 
enrichment levels in HEU declared excess to national security needs stems from U.S. 
Navy insistence that such material be reserved for its possible future needs. With the 
exception of the first 10 tons declared excess, all of the HEU that the U.S. has declared 
excess failed to meet the specifications for use in naval fuel.
39 Of the 174.3 excess tons of 
HEU, about 33 tons are enriched over 92%, and 142 tons are enriched between 20 to 
92%.  
 
Moreover, the pledges given by the U.S. that no fuel ever put under international 
safeguards will be withdrawn for military purposes do not apply to the Navy.
 It could 
withdraw HEU that has been declared excess to national security needs and put under 
safeguards, to use it as naval reactor fuel.
40 However, the Navy has never evoked its 
unique pullback option. The U.S. Navy plans well and probably does not intend to use 
currently safeguarded excess material for its programs; moreover, attempting to do so 
would a steep uphill political climb.  The policy of withdrawal allowance should undergo 
review, as it is likely to undermine the evolving norm of irreversibility in nuclear arms 
control. 
 
The lack of transparency on the Russian naval fuel cycle  
 
As is the case for the U.S., no official figures exist today on Russia’s stockpiles of fissile 
material in general, or on its naval stocks in particular. Transparency is extremely 
limited.
41 Estimates, all of them involving huge uncertainties, indicate a remaining 
military HEU stock in Russia of 1,010 tons at the end of 1997, including the 500 tons of 
HEU slated for sale to the United States under the U.S.–Russian HEU deal. Russia’s 
overall HEU naval fuel production through the year 2000 alone is estimated at more than 
140 tons.
42 Russia alone may now hold as much as 80 to 85 metric tons of HEU for naval 
  12propulsion.
43 This proliferation-attractive material has never been exposed to 
international or bilateral control or safeguards. 
 
However, as part of ongoing efforts to secure fissile material in Russia, the joint U.S.–
Russian MPC&A upgrading at naval facilities has been quite successful, and clearly 
better able to deal with the sensitivity issues hampering other parts of the assistance 
program.
44 The DOE has forged close working relationships with officials in the Russian 
Navy, overcome security concerns about the location of the naval fuel, and gained access 
to install physical protection systems and accountancy systems at these centralized but 
still sensitive sites. This may be a sound start for future transparency on the Russian naval 
nuclear fuel cycle.
45 
 
The lack of safeguards on naval nuclear cycles in non-nuclear weapon 
states 
 
Naval nuclear stockpiles outside the nuclear weapon states may also constitute a potential 
problem. Paragraph 14 of the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT 
allows any state to withdraw nuclear material for peaceful uses from safeguards if it is 
being used for a “non-proscribed military activity”.
46 Thus, naval nuclear fuel may 
represent a loophole for nuclear weapon production even outside the nuclear weapon 
states. True, the safeguards agreement stresses that, during the period of non-application 
of safeguards, the nuclear material must not be used for the production of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, there is no prohibition of the non-
explosive use of nuclear material, equipment or technology for a military purpose such as 
the propulsion of naval ship. Against this backdrop, concerns have been voiced that the 
naval fuel cycle could be used as a back door to nuclear weapons.
47  
 
A non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT that wishes to acquire enriched uranium for 
submarine propulsion could either invoke the paragraph 14 exemption or could avoid 
IAEA safeguards entirely by obtaining unsafeguarded material from a nuclear weapon 
state or a non-NPT state.
48 The latter is possible because the NPT requires safeguards 
  13only on special fissionable material provided to a non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful 
nuclear activities.
49  
 
More far-reaching scenarios could include non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT 
building uranium enrichment and fuel fabrication plants for the production of submarine 
fuel and claiming that the material is not subject to IAEA safeguards since it is dedicated 
to non-proscribed military use. There would be no means for verifying that the material 
and facilities were not being misused to make nuclear weapons. In either case, the result 
would be that some of the HEU in a non-nuclear weapon state under the NPT would not 
be subject to IAEA safeguards. This loophole was deliberately introduced into the treaty 
to accommodate some of the states involved in the negotiations and who were 
considering acquiring nuclear-propelled naval craft and wished to avoid foreign 
inspections, accountable to an international organization, on board such ships.
50  
 
Increased transparency in the naval fuel cycle can also be paramount for the U.S. goal of 
prompting a resumption of negotiations on the next key multilateral step in the nuclear 
disarmament process: a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
51 If a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 
is to be implemented with a high level of confidence that no clandestine HEU diversion is 
taking place, and to bolster the HEU stockpile accounting and control under such a treaty, 
then the non-explosive uses of HEU (e.g. naval uses) must comprise part of the 
agreement. 
 
The strategic importance of submarines makes probable a sustained interest in nuclear 
submarine propulsion across the world.
52 Moreover, Russia’s emphasis on floating 
reactors to provide energy to remote areas may lead to increased use and possible future 
exports of naval reactor technology and HEU fuel. Guidelines and a regime have been 
proposed and advocated to limit the potential impact of the current HEU loophole in the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty –without significant political support so far.
53 A related 
approach for increasing international confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel would 
involve establishing a norm of increased, voluntary transparency. If implemented, such a 
  14norm could boost long-term nuclear safety of both non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear 
weapon states. In the following, the possible components of such a transparency standard 
will be discussed.  
 
  15Chapter 4: Components of a naval nuclear fuel transparency 
regime  
 
The introduction of transparency on sensitive items will have to balance carefully the 
information extracted against security and classification concerns. All the same, there 
seem to be good prospects of such measures being implemented on the sensitive naval 
fuel cycle, as political acceptance of the concept of transparency is emerging. This could, 
together with the new technical opportunities of high-quality and non-intrusive 
verification measures, create an important foundation for new transparency initiatives.
54 
 
The naval nuclear fuel transparency measures could include the following as part of a 
more comprehensive, future transparency regime: 
55  
  
o  declarations of total HEU quantities dedicated to naval propulsion (including 
estimates of future needs)  
o  voluntary, non-intrusive verification on designated parts of the naval fuel cycle  
o  description of all facilities used for producing naval fuel, including production 
records and material balances for each facility  
o  information on the status of each naval fuel batch (whether fresh fuel/spent fuel, 
in storage, or in operating reactors, and its final disposition) and location of the 
material 
o  an account of any fissile material removed from the naval inventory, such as:  
o  material consumed during operation 
o  material transferred to the national surplus stockpile and/or down-blended 
to LEU (low-enriched uranium)  
o  declarations of any naval fuel placed under international safeguards.  
 
Declarations on the status of the fuel batches, estimates of future fuel needs and the 
accounting of material removed from the naval cycle should be made regularly, perhaps 
on an annual basis. In the following, each of the items above will be discussed in more 
detail, and on-going and related nuclear arms-control activities will be presented.  
 
  16Declarations of the total HEU quantities dedicated to naval propulsion 
 
Due to major uncertainties as to current stocks of fissile material, both initial and regular 
declarations are particularly important. Confidence in the declarations given would be 
boosted if non-intrusive spot checks of these declarations were permitted.
56 Information 
on the mass, chemical and isotopic composition (enrichment) of the fuel is desirable 
because it promote greater confidence in the declarations, but this may also raise the risk 
of reveling and disseminating highly sensitive proliferation information.  
 
The total declared quantities of uranium and the annual consumption levels can be 
estimated on the basis of operating history and other open-source information. Other 
countries – or, under bilateral U.S.–Russian transparency agreements, the U.S. and 
Russia – can evaluate whether the quantity declared for naval purposes appears plausible 
on the basis of its understanding of the number, the power, and operating patterns of the 
reactors. Their inspectors should verify that the amounts being released into the naval 
fuel cycle match the declarations.
57  
 
Moreover, as spent naval fuel will be less proliferation-attractive (due to the high 
radiation levels), early transparency measures could focus on verifying the status of the 
spent fuel. At the back end of the fuel cycle, if the spent fuel were reprocessed, inspectors 
could check the weights and assays of the recovered uranium and plutonium. It would 
also be possible to assess declarations of the amounts of uranium-235 that had been 
fissioned by measuring the quantity of uranium-236 in the residual uranium.
58 
 
Formalized agreements already exist for some fissile material stockpile declarations. One 
example is the guidelines agreed to by the five declared nuclear weapon states under the 
NPT, together with Belgium, Germany, Japan and Switzerland, to increase the 
transparency of the management of civil plutonium by publishing annual statements of 
each country’s holdings of civilian plutonium.
59 In principle, these guidelines cover all 
plutonium in all peaceful activities, but focus on the material that poses the greatest 
proliferation concern: Separated plutonium, whether in storage, in unirradiated mixed 
  17oxide (MOX) fuel elements, in other unirradiated fabricated forms, or in the course of 
manufacture or fabrication into these items. The guidelines also apply to plutonium 
declared excess to military nuclear programs. Plutonium in spent fuel is not the focus of 
the guidelines, but each country has agreed to publish annual estimates of the amount of 
plutonium in its spent nuclear fuel. 
  
The nine nations which have agreed to the guidelines will publish:  
o  occasional brief statements explaining their national strategy for nuclear power 
and spent fuel, and their general plans for managing national holdings of 
plutonium  
o  annual statements of their holdings of all plutonium subject to the guidelines 
o  annual statements of their estimate of the plutonium contained in their holdings of 
spent civil reactor fuel.  
 
These annual publications of the civil holdings have been generally successful in creating 
more transparency. However, in accordance with the goal of universal membership and 
adherence, more countries possessing civilian plutonium need to be involved. Still, the 
plutonium declarations could serve as a useful model for future naval fuel declarations. 
 
Voluntary, non-intrusive verification on designated parts of the naval 
fuel cycle 
 
Any forms of verification allowed to be performed on the sensitive naval fuel cycles are 
likely to boost confidence in declarations and the overall transparency. Also here, the 
challenge is to protect classified information while allowing the inspecting party to draw 
independent and accurate conclusions.  
 
Some elements of a fissile verification regime for sensitive HEU stocks have already 
been introduced, both through bilateral and trilateral agreements. The U.S.–Russian HEU 
deal and the trilateral IAEA–U.S.–Russian cooperation to remove excess material from 
military stocks have generated verification and monitoring measures, all within 
acceptable ranges of the nuclear weapon states involved.
60 Such measures, briefly 
  18described in the following, may provide an important point of departure for future non-
intrusive HEU verification of the naval fuel cycle. 
 
The HEU deal 
 
February 1993 saw the signing of the Agreement between the Government of the United 
States and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Disposition of 
Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons. This HEU deal allowed, for 
the first time, the conversion of weapon-grade nuclear material from dismantled 
warheads to commercial reactor fuel for electricity generation. Commonly referred to as 
“Megatons to Megawatts”, the deal had, by the end of 1999, resulted in the dilution of 
over 35 tons of weapons-usable uranium. In many ways, the HEU deal may constitute the 
single most important nonproliferation measure introduced bilaterally, covering a 
significant part of Russia’s weapon stockpile of HEU.  
After a slow start and organizational difficulties, implementation of the agreement is 
accelerating and new transparency measures have been installed. For the U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE), there are three transparency objectives. Firstly, that the 
HEU is extracted from nuclear weapons, secondly, that the same HEU is oxidized, and 
finally that the HEU is blended into LEU.
61 For MINATOM,
62 the transparency objective 
is that the LEU is fabricated into fuel for commercial nuclear power reactors.
63  
Portable instruments are used to confirm the presence of HEU in weapons-component 
containers; once the component has been removed from the unique shipping container, 
U.S. monitors use the instruments to confirm that no HEU remains in the container. The 
portable units determine the level of U-235 enrichment of metal chips that results from 
the machining of the HEU metal components from the weapons.
64 Even though the 
choice fell on a system less intrusive and less likely to reveal sensitive information, after 
over two years of operation, all its measurements had been consistent with the declared 
enrichment.
65 
 
The Trilateral initiative 
 
  19The removal of weapon-origin fissile material from the defense programs of Russia and 
the U.S. furthers the obligations of the two states under the Article VI of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The Trilateral Initiative would place both excess U.S. fissile material 
and excess Russian fissile material stored at the Mayak facility (in the Chelyabinsk 
region) under IAEA safeguards. Progress has been made toward completing a model 
verification agreement that will serve as the basis for implementing the new verification 
measures. Unfortunately, progress on these measures has been slow, both because the 
measures overlap with the U.S.–Russian negotiations on Mayak transparency and 
because concerns about protecting sensitive information from international inspections 
remain.
66 
 
Under the Trilateral initiative, the requirement is not to verify the weapons origin of HEU 
and plutonium but to promote international confidence in the assurance that the material 
is not used in the production of new weapons. The aim is to provide transparency on the 
steps taken to reduce the stocks of fissile material potentially available for the use in 
nuclear weapon programs.
67 Thus, the commitments to the initiative must be irrevocable, 
and verification must follow from storage through the disposition activities, remaining in 
effect until the fissile material is rendered no longer usable in nuclear weapons. 
 
To begin the trilateral IAEA verification as early as possible, special technical provisions 
are being developed that will allow the two states to submit dismantled nuclear weapon 
components or other classified forms of fissile material, with the assurance that IAEA 
inspectors will not acquire information relating to the design or manufacture of such 
weapons.
68 The U.S. will ensure that the material (and facilities) which it has opened for 
international inspection will not provide IAEA inspectors with proliferation-sensitive 
information. This is to be accomplished by vulnerability assessments, by limiting the 
information given to international inspectors to that has been determined to be safeguard-
relevant and mission-essential.
69  
 
Important progress has been made in developing and testing verification equipment. A 
prototype verification system for plutonium has been built and demonstrated (under 
  20conditions expected in the field) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. This prototype 
combines standard non-destructive measurement techniques with a new technology 
known as “information barriers” designed to allow inspectors to derive sufficient, 
credible information for verification, while preventing access to classified information. 
The prototype provides a means to evaluate previously identified concepts. Tests have 
shown that verification under the security constraints could meet the security exigencies 
of the states and the verification requirements of the IAEA.
70 As equipment for HEU 
measurements evolve, the techniques and procedures are probably applicable to the 
sensitive naval fuel cycle as well.  
 
Description of naval fuel-producing facilities  
 
Better knowledge of the production history of naval fuel-producing facilities ensures 
against clandestine production, simultaneously raising confidence that no such production 
is taking place. The introduction of transparency measures on naval fuel production 
facilities will be challenging, but ongoing international work may support such efforts.  
 
The new Model Protocol, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected) represents an attempt to broaden the 
scope of international safeguards with much more comprehensive declarations.
71 Under 
this safeguards protocol, states are required to declare and submit to international control 
all nuclear material production facilities, whether operating or not. Many of the same set 
of provisions is likely to be included in a future Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, to avoid 
covert weapon production and suspicion of such activities. Again, it can be worth 
exploring the symbiotic effects on the naval fuel cycle, concerning naval fuel production 
facilities in particular.  
 
The status of naval fuel batches 
 
It may be desirable to have descriptions and inspections at such production facilities as 
the Russian Electrostal's fabrication line for highly enriched uranium fuel, but this is 
unlikely to be accepted due to sensitivity problems. Alternatives to boost confidence in 
non-diversion could therefore be explored. By introducing tags and seals on the 
  21transportation containers leaving the production facility, fuel batches could be tracked 
throughout the fuel cycle, from the production line to temporary storage, up to the stage 
when the fuel is introduced into the reactors. The container tags could be reapplied after 
submarines have been refueled/defueled, tracking the fuel to the point of final disposition 
or use (or down-blending).  
 
An account of fissile material removed from the naval inventory 
 
Whether the removal of fissile material occurs through consumption or transfers, any and 
all material removed from the naval stockpiles should be accounted for. Declared 
consumption levels may again be checked against estimates based on open-source 
information and submarine operating history. In the event that naval fuel is put under 
international safeguards, specific declarations should be made.  
 
  22Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
The lack of transparency on the naval fuel cycles is likely to be detrimental to long-term 
nuclear security of both nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The 
persistent interest in naval nuclear propulsion around the world, possible exports of 
Russian naval reactor technology, and the tempting naval nuclear loophole in the NPT 
safeguards agreement – all of these could create new HEU markets beyond international 
control. The need for an international transparency norm to increase confidence in non-
diversion of highly enriched naval fuel to clandestine nuclear weapon production may 
therefore be stronger than anticipated. 
 
The components of the transparency regime for naval fuel proposed here represent a 
minimal, non-intrusive approach to avoid the disclosure of sensitive information while at 
the same time providing a way of increasing the confidence in non-diversion of naval fuel 
to nuclear weapon production. Today there is growing political interest in nuclear 
transparency in general. Technical transparency solutions that might be applied on the 
naval fuel cycle are evolving in related nuclear arms-control arenas.  
 
Thus, a step-wise approach, allowing to increase the confidence of the international 
community and potential opponents in non-diversion of the highly proliferation attractive 
naval fuel to clandestine weapon production, should be considered. In particular, such a 
transparency regime could consist of a combination of voluntary declarations of 
quantities and qualities of material destined for naval consumption, and, desirably, non-
intrusive spot-checks on strategic points along the fuel cycle.  
 
Experience from bilateral nuclear security cooperation with Russia has shown that 
cooperative programs can succeed only if they are carried out as true partnerships, as 
ventures serving both Russian and American interests.
72 To create the proper 
environment for naval fuel transparency measures, the U.S. could take the lead and 
reiterate and expand U.S.–Russian transparency efforts, tailoring the transparency 
measures to fit Russia’s own interests by offering strategic, technical and financial 
  23incentives. A valuable foundation for non-intrusive transparency on the Russian naval 
fuel cycle has been created by the highly successful cooperative naval fuel security 
upgrades, due to the close working relations established and the ongoing consolidation of 
fuel to a limited set of storages.  
 
To support these efforts, the U.S. could consider allowing surplus naval fuel to be 
included in the national declarations of excess nuclear material. Additionally, it could 
abandon its current option of allowing nuclear materials to be withdrawn from 
international safeguards for the use as naval fuel.
73  
 
  24  25Appendix I: U.S. and Russian Naval Fuel – Current and 
Future Needs
74 
 
In this appendix the current and future needs of naval fuel in the U.S. and Russia are 
assessed, as part of an investigation of how well and how easy a future naval fuel 
transparency regime may be implemented politically,. The United States and Russia both 
have extensive naval propulsion programs which use highly enriched uranium (HEU) in 
the reactor cores. Their naval programs involve by far the largest fleets globally.
75 The 
naval fuel cycle represents some 10 to 15% of the total HEU economy in both states.  
 
For various reasons, fuel requirements in the two countries are likely to be reduced over 
the coming decades. While the overall U.S. naval fuel requirement will be reduced 
mainly due to the introduction of life-time reactor cores and some decline in the number 
of operating reactors, Russian naval HEU consumption will continue to decrease due to 
the Russian Navy’s reduced operational status and severe fleet reductions. Ideally, such 
reduced fuel demands could serve to facilitate the implementation of non-intrusive, 
voluntary transparency measures on proliferation-attractive fresh naval fuel.  
 
This appendix scrutinizes current U.S. and Russian stockpiles and future needs of HEU 
for naval propulsion. Both navies maintain a high degree of secrecy around their nuclear 
operations, and very little is declared officially about submarine nuclear fuel designs, 
production technology, and operational data. However, assessments of the current and 
future naval fuel economy can be made on the basis of the number of operating vessels 
and other available open-source information.  
 
U.S. naval program 
 
U.S. naval nuclear propulsion reactors use uranium enriched to at least 93% in U-235.
76 
This is material that is directly useable in nuclear weapons.
77 On the basis of estimates 
during the 1980s, Cochran et al. found that a U.S. submarine reactor core contains an 
average of 200 kg of U-235 enriched to 97.3%, the rest of the core being U-238.
78 Larger 
as well as smaller core loads are possible, but such enrichment levels are supported by 
  26other open-source information.
79 Over the years U.S. naval reactor technology has 
improved, increasing both the power output and the overall performance of submarines, 
and leading to a steady increase in the core lifetimes of reactors.
80 Today’s U.S. 
submarines put to sea with reactors that will last the life of the ship, obviating the need 
for refueling.
81  
 
Naval fuel is highly robust and designed to operate for many years in a high-temperature, 
high-pressure environment.
82 To ensure that it will be capable of withstanding battle 
shock loads, naval fuel is surrounded by large amounts of zirconium alloy.
83 Further 
exploitation of the modified fuel process and better understanding of various reactor 
technologies that permit more optimized designs will further increase the energy density 
for the next generation of naval reactors. Currently, new structural material, coolant 
chemistries, reactor plant arrangements, and core configurations are being investigated by 
the U.S. Naval Reactors.
84 
 
Forty percent of the combatant ships of the U.S. Navy are nuclear powered, including all 
U.S. submarines and 75% of the aircraft carriers.
85 Taking into account also the naval 
prototypes, 103 U.S. naval reactors were operating as of October 1999 (see table A1).
86 
This makes the number of U.S. naval reactors comparable to the number of commercial 
power reactors in the U.S. This is also nearly equal to the number of reactors in the next 
two largest commercial nuclear power-producing countries, France and Japan, combined. 
All U.S. naval reactors are of the light-water pressurized type (PWR).
87 
 
 
 
Type of 
vessel  
Number 
of vessels 
Number of 
reactors in 
vessel 
Total 
number of 
reactors 
SSBN
88   18  1  18 
SSN
89 56 1  56 
NR-1
90   1  1  1 
Nuclear 
aircraft 
carriers
91   
 
9 
 
2 (8) 
 
16 + 8 
Prototypes
92 4  1  4 
SUM   88    103 
  27Table A1. U.S. naval reactors operating as of October 1999  
 
 
During the 1990s, the U.S. ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force was reduced from 32 
submarines (armed with 584 missiles and 5024 warheads) to 18 submarines (carrying 432 
missiles with 3456 warheads).
93 In 1990, 23 of the active submarines dated from the 
1960s. In contrast, today’s SSBN fleet consists entirely of Ohio-class submarines.  
 
The fleet of attack submarines (SSNs) included more than 90 boats throughout most of 
the 1980s, and peaked at 98 boats in 1987.
94 The number of operating U.S. attack 
submarines is dropping as the U.S. Navy is remodeling its submarine force for the 21
st 
century. Today, 82 fast-attack submarines are assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific 
Submarine Forces,
95 56 of which are nuclear propelled. The older SSNs, some of them 
launched back in the 1960s and 70s, will successively be decommissioned and replaced 
by the New Attack Submarines (NSSNs). In September 1999, the keel was laid for the 
U.S. Navy’s first new nuclear attack submarine, USS Virginia, the lead ship in what will 
be called the Virginia-class submarines. 
 
The U.S. fleet has undergone extensive modernization and reductions in recent decades. 
Between 1995 and the end of 1999, the number of operating reactors was reduced from 
158 to 103. The reactor fuel and core vendor industrial base has shrunk in response to the 
downsizing of the Navy following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and in response to the 
reduced requirements due to the continuously increasing lifetimes achieved in HEU-
reactor cores.
96 The United States is now disposing of reactors from decommissioned 
ships at the rate of about six per year.
97  
 
Future U.S. naval reactors and fuel consumption levels 
 
No new SSBNs are currently projected, but existing U.S. Department of Defense 
guidelines call for a force of 50 attack submarines, although some studies have called for 
raising the number to as many as 72.
98 As for the strategic vessels, the same uncertainties 
in out-year projections of the defense budget render the future SSN manufacture 
uncertain. Under the most extensive plans, the U.S. Navy plans to spend USD 64 billion 
  28to acquire 30 New Attack Submarines by the year 2016.
99 These purchases will allow the 
Navy to maintain its force-structure goal of 50 boats. Higher numbers would require 
modifications to current plans.
100 
 
The future deployment of other types of naval reactors is also fairly constant. The new 
carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and the new CVN77 will replace older, 
conventional aircraft carriers taken out of operation.
101 The Navy is likely to keep two 
prototypes for R&D on energy efficiency and training of personnel.
102 In the course of 
1999, DOE inactivated and defueled six shutdown prototype reactor plants.
103 The NR-1, 
a nuclear-powered ocean engineering and research submarine, continues its service to the 
Navy and many research and educational institutions. This vessel was overhauled and 
refueled in 1993 after an operating period of 24 years.
104  
 
The U.S. Navy buys reactor cores many years before they are actually loaded: a ten-year 
advance procurement seems customary.
 As of 1995 enough HEU was already available to 
cover projected U.S. naval requirements until about 2006.
105 As the portion of the 
Portsmouth enrichment plant that made weapons-grade uranium was closed in 1992, 
naval reactors now depend on the existing inventory of weapons-grade uranium. The U.S 
produced 994 tons of HEU from 1945 to 1992, when production ended.
106 However, the 
amount of HEU already used or incorporated into weapons has yet not been declassified. 
As part of its openness policy, DOE expects to complete a report in which it will detail 
the U.S. production, acquisition, uses, inventories and disposition of HEU from 1945. 
Over its lifetime, the U.S. naval propulsion program has designed, built and operated 
more than 30 distinct types of reactors.
107 Early naval reactors had a lifetime of about two 
to four years. A modern attack submarine (SSN) has a ship life of approximately 30 
years. On the basis of statistics of U.S. Navy reactor cores, a study in the 1980s assumed 
a ten-year average life for reactor cores.
108 This figure is supported by more recent 
studies
109 that have indicated the need for refueling twice during the normal lifetime of 
the current vessels. The Navy is currently designing reactor cores to last 50 years for 
  29aircraft carriers, 40 years for SSBNs, and 30 years for SSNs.
110 These core developments 
would eliminate the need for submarine refueling altogether.
111 
The operation modes of strategic nuclear submarines will be on a lower energy output 
than the faster attack submarines, prolonging the lifetimes of their cores. The cores of the 
last of the Ohio-class submarines, designed in the late 1970s, will operate for over 20 
years without refueling.
112 The last Ohio-class submarine with this core technology was 
delivered in 1996.
113 If a strategic U.S. force is to be maintained, however, a new class of 
SSBNs must be built to replace the current Ohio class. By the time this new class of ships 
is designed, a 45-year HEU core should be feasible for submarines.
114 The same will 
apply for the new aircraft carriers. Existing core technology and consumption levels for 
SSBNs and aircraft carriers will remain in the years to come, however, thus requiring at 
least one refueling during their operational life.
115 
By assuming a lifetime for the submarines of 30 years and a lifetime of 45 years for the 
aircraft carriers, and assuming compliance with the START treaties, we can derive the 
expected total number of operating naval reactors. Providing that the U.S. Navy’s most 
extensive plans are initiated – with 30 new attack submarines – the total number of 
operating U.S. Naval reactors by 2020 will be 86 (14 SSBNs, 49 SSNs and 10 aircraft 
carriers, 2 submarines for training, research and development, plus the NR-1). The 
development of the nuclear-propelled fleet is presented in Figure A1, with the 
decommissioning of older vessels taken into account.  
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Figure A1. U.S. Naval reactors operating until 2020, given the proposed production of 
30 new SSNs 
 
According to current production schemes, the number of operating naval reactors will be 
reduced to 86 by 2020, as compared to the 103 reactors operating in 1999.
116  
 
In 1995, with 158 operating U.S. naval reactors, the annual burn-up of U-235 in the entire 
fleet was reported to be approximately 1.1 tons.
117 Thus, as a crude approximation, on 
average each U.S. reactor used 7 kg of U-235 during that year of operation. The annual 
burn-up 20 years from now will be approximately 600 kg of HEU, or slightly more than 
half of the 1995 burn-up.
118 
 
Probably more important in the longer term, however, are technical developments in the 
reactor core. The introduction of life-time reactor core technology will mean new and 
unparalleled fuel saving benefits. As mentioned, U.S. submarines today put to sea 
equipped with reactors designed to last the life of the ship, obviating the need for 
  31refueling.
119 Thus, even with the most extensive U.S. submarine modernization and 
production plans, with 30 new attack submarines within the coming two decades,
120 the 
U.S. Navy will need less HEU.  
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Figure A2: Annual integrated HEU fuel consumption ratio relative to 2000 levels for 
U.S. attack submarine. The relative decline is mostly due to the introduction of new 
reactor technology. 
 
By 2020, with the successful launching of all the planned new SSNs with lifetime cores 
and the decommissioning of 40 old SSNs (due to expired service lifetimes), the annual 
lifetime integrated naval HEU fuel consumption of U-235 for U.S. attack submarines will 
be 60% of the levels for the year 2000 (see Figure A2).
121 Beyond 2025, including only 
the new SSNs, the lifetime integrated fuel loads of HEU will be 6 tons of U-235, 
contrasted with the 18 tons required to meet the consumption needs if old core 
technology were still applied.
122 
 
Russia’s naval program  
 
  32Today’s Russian submarines use HEU as well, but with enrichment levels ranging from 
40 to 90%.
123 Russia’s nuclear-propelled icebreaker fleet uses fuel with the same 
enrichment levels, as the reactors in these icebreakers were used as test-beds for Russian 
nuclear submarine reactors. The proportion of incidents of diversion involving naval 
HEU in Russia has been notably high.
124 Naval fuel seems to have been particularly 
exposed to theft, and the enrichment levels of the fuel involved make such attempts 
worrisome.  
In the Murmansk region of Russia alone, six known thefts of naval HEU fuel took place 
between 1993 and 1996.
125 Insiders, either military personnel or contract workers at the 
shipyards, were often involved in these incidents.
126 In September 1999, thieves disabled 
a nuclear submarine by pilfering vital equipment.
127 In January 2000, four Russian sailors 
and a retired officer were arrested for stealing a fuel rod from a nuclear powered 
submarine.
128 This misdeed was economically motivated, carried out by key personnel 
with detailed knowledge about the security systems and the necessary protective 
measures.  
 
In terms of submarines and naval reactors produced, the Russian naval program 
outmatches that of the U.S. However, Russia’s submarines are now at an all-time low in 
terms of deployment and readiness, spending significant time in port due to the current 
economic situation in Russia. The severe budget crunch has forced the Russian Navy to 
retire older attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines prematurely, and to 
concentrate its limited sources on maintaining only the most modern assets – the Oscar 
and Akula attack submarines and the Delta IV SSBN.
129 Less frequent deployment at sea 
helps extend the service lives of existing systems.
130  
 
For nearly three months starting in early May 1998, Russia had no operational SSBNs at 
sea.
131 Russia does not have the money to maintain and repair its six huge Typhoon 
submarines, so these vessels have not been on active duty since 1995. In the Fall of 1999 
it was decided to decommission the Typhoons before they reached the end of their 
operational lifetime.
132 However, in early 2000 news reports indicated that three of six 
  33Typhoon-class submarines would remain in active operation to test new strategic 
missiles.
133 
 
Since 1958, the Soviet Union and Russia have constructed 249 nuclear-powered 
submarines, representing more than half of the submarines produced worldwide.
134 Two 
thirds of these vessels were delivered to the Northern Fleet, the rest were destined for the 
Pacific Fleet. In addition to combat submarines, five research and development 
submarines and several full-sized land-based submarine-training facilities have been 
produced. Additionally, the eight ships in the Russian icebreaker fleet are nuclear 
propelled, each with one or two reactors and accompanied by four battle cruisers and a 
communication ship with twin reactors.
 Most Russian submarines are equipped with two 
reactors. The overall number of naval reactors produced by the Soviet Union/Russia is 
therefore at least 480.The vessels use fuel enriched from below 21% to 90%.
135 Of these, 
a total of 24 reactors are believed to have been designed to use uranium enriched to 90% 
U-235.
136 
 
Deployment peaked in 1989, when approximately 196 submarines were in service.
137 
Most of the submarines have now reached the end of their service lives and have been 
decommissioned. These vessels await dismantlement, a process involving huge safety 
(environmental) and security challenges.
138 As of early 1999, the Russian force was 
composed of 26 SSBNs (and SSGNs) and 22 SSNs.
139 
 
Future Russian naval reactors and fuel consumption levels 
 
The current socio-economic situation in Russia renders the size of the future Russian 
submarine forces extremely uncertain. A minimum force will probably remain, especially 
as the strategic role of Russian submarines is likely to increase. If the START II treaty is 
ever implemented, over half of the remaining Russian warheads will be based on 
SSBNs.
140  
 
Russia is therefore likely to maintain a limited number of modern submarines (SSBNs) in 
the coming decade, eventually replacing the last Delta IIIs, built in the mid- to late-
  341970s, with the new Borey class.
141 The Delta III is the only SSBN currently deployed 
with the Pacific Fleet. If not enough Borey-class submarines are deployed to maintain the 
number of vessels in both the Northern and the Pacific Fleets, the Russian Navy will have 
to consolidate its SSBN operations with the Northern Fleet.
142 
 
According to Russian naval officers, by 2005 or 2006 Russia will retain only 10–12 
submarines as nuclear weapon platforms.
143 These figures are supported by members of 
the Russian Duma who have claimed that the Navy will need 65 to 72 submarines in the 
21
st century, including 12 to 13 SSBNs, the same number of SSNs to protect these 
SSBNs, and 10 to 12 SSNs each in the Northern and Pacific Fleets to engage in tactical 
operations and monitor enemy SSBNs.
144  
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Figure A3. Operating Russian ballistic missile submarines 1989 to 2010. Predicted 
figures are maximum numbers, depending both on the finalization of projected 
submarines and on prolonged lifetimes of existing SSBNs.  
 
This figure seems, however, to depend on the production of several new ships. Even if 10 
Boreys are produced, the Russian SSBN force could shrink to as few as 4 to 12 ships.
145 
The current production plans and actual progress do not support an extensive Russian 
  35submarine manufacture. The keel of the fourth-generation strategic missile Yuriy 
Dolgorukiy of the Borey class was laid down in November 1996. However, work on the 
vessel, the only nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine under construction, has been 
halted pending a redesign of the missile system.
146 The submarine was scheduled for 
launch in 2002, but is now planned to enter service in 2010. Thus, Russia’s existing 
strategic submarines may have to enter more demanding operating schedules, and 
decreased service lives might result.
147  
  
The keel of the first of the fourth-generation attack submarines, the Severodvinsk class, 
was laid down in late 1993. However, work on the submarine has been suspended since 
1996. Currently progress is slow to the point where the program is in doubt.
148 Unless 
shipyard workers are paid regularly and equipment manufactures supported by industry, 
these submarines will take a very long time to complete. Between 1999 and 2005 three 
attack submarines are scheduled for launch – but also here, implementation of these plans 
remains uncertain.  
 
Despite the economic problems, the Russian icebreaker fleet is likely to continue 
operating in the coming decades. Given an estimated lifetime of 35 years,
149 six of the 
eight icebreakers will keep going until 2010 and three, or possibly four, will operate until 
2025. The construction of a new icebreaker, “50 Let Pobedy”, formerly called “Ural”, 
was begun back in 1989, scheduled to enter service in 1994. Scarce funding and a 
reduction of cargo shipments in the Arctic regions have caused contract delays. However, 
starting in 2000, limited annual funding for the completion of the icebreaker has been 
made available.
150 
 
Moreover, given the success of the Russian naval nuclear propulsion program, the 
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has proposed extending the uses of these reactors to 
provide electricity and heat to remote communities.
151 This would involve placing the 
reactors on floating barges to be transported to coastal areas or possibly underground, e.g. 
in mines, to make extensive sources of energy available locally. These plans have yet to 
be implemented, and again, the economic situation makes the future deployment of naval 
  36reactors as miniature power plants uncertain. However, given Russia’s persistent energy 
needs, particularly in the Far North and Far East, the push for the use of non-propulsion, 
naval power reactors is likely to increase in the coming years. Russian officials claim that 
the International Atomic Energy Agency has approved the initial designs for these 
reactors.
152 
 
Very limited information is released on the Russian reactor cores, uranium enrichment 
level, and core lifetimes. Generally, higher enrichment levels will allow longer operating 
times, and a critical design objective is refueling periods of up to nine to ten years. 
However, with lower enrichment levels, core lives of approximately seven years are more 
probable, depending on operating modes.
153 Various different fuel geometries and shapes 
have been applied for former Soviet, now Russian, nuclear submarine reactor production. 
The Soviet Union developed four generations of naval pressurized reactors, each 
generation with improved reliability, compactness, and silence of operation. However, 
there are no reports to indicate substantially prolonged core lives even in the latest 
generation of submarines. The third-generation reactors (OK-650) began entering into 
service in 1987.
154 None of the fourth-generation submarines have so far been put to sea.  
 
First- and second-generation submarines generally have U-235 enrichment levels below 
21%, while specific classes (e.g. November and Alfa) reportedly have 90% enrichment 
levels.
155 The third generation is probably enriched in a range of 21% to 45%.
156 Such 
enrichment levels correspond well to the operational periods of these submarines, with 
refueling occurring approximately every seven years. In the past, the Russian Navy and 
the icebreaker fleet each required five to ten fresh cores annually.
157 In recent years 
however, the naval fuel requirement has dropped to a few cores per year, as the 
Murmansk Shipping Company (the operator of the icebreaker fleet) and the Russian 
Navy each conducts one to two refuelings a year.
158 
 
Russia’s icebreakers and submarines use the same reactor concepts; these icebreakers 
have been used as test beds for the development of submarine reactors. As the icebreaker 
reactor core is much more accessible than a submarine core, it is easier to cope with the 
  37problems of potential fuel element rupture.
159 Moreover, defueling or refueling an 
icebreaker does not involve the lengthy processes of opening and sealing the hull, as with 
submarines. Current icebreakers use enrichment levels ranging from 20 to 90%.
160 Non-
homogeneous enrichment levels within each of the cores are possible, for example with a 
HEU enrichment gradient of 20% from the core perimeter to the center of the reactor 
core.
161 
 
Little information is available on the sources, uses and inventories of Russian HEU. 
Estimates indicate a total Soviet/Russian production of 1,400 tons of weapons-grade 
HEU from 1950 through 1988, after the production of HEU for defense purposes 
stopped.
162 The inventory of remaining military HEU stocks in Russia was estimated to 
1,010 tons at the end of 1997,
163 including the 500 tons of HEU slated for sale to the 
United States under the U.S.–Russian HEU deal. This HEU inventory estimate does not, 
however, include any HEU dedicated to the naval fuel cycle. According to calculations 
made by Oleg Bukharin, the average amount of U-235 in Russian ship reactor cores is 
approximately 100 kg.
164 With an estimated need for three (re)fueling sessions per 
reactor, overall U-235 consumption for all the 478 naval reactor cores produced is thus 
roughly 143 tons.  
 
By assuming an average enrichment level of 30% and 315 kg of uranium on average in 
the reactor cores,
165 we can perform simple calculations of the fuel savings in the period 
1999 to 2005. As seen, the number of strategic submarines will decrease from 26 to 
approximately 12. Due to the very limited construction of new submarines, the number of 
SSNs is, as a conservative approximation, assumed to remain constant. Normally, each 
submarine uses three batches of uranium fuel, or approximately 950 kg. Thus, due to 
reduction in the strategic submarine fleet, the impact on naval fuel consumption 
constitutes a reduction of approximately 13.3 tons of intermediately enriched uranium 
(30%), or nearly 4 tons of U-235 – corresponding to a reduction in the annual U-235 
consumption of approximately 800 kg over the next five years.  
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Appendix II: U.S. and Russian Naval Fuel – Proliferation 
Potential  
 
In this appendix the proliferation attractiveness of highly enriched naval fuel is assessed. 
This is partly done by looking at the enrichment levels of the fuel and partly by assessing 
the challenges associated with using the fuel in crude nuclear devices. The assessments 
performed are crude first-order approximations and should be regarded preliminary.  
 
With the end of the Cold War, the vast quantities of nuclear weapon-usable material have 
emerged as one of the most important threats to international security. At the center of 
technical proliferation concerns is the direct-use material that can be employed to make 
nuclear weapons without further enrichment or reprocessing.
166 Plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium (HEU) are the key ingredients of nuclear weapons. The management 
and control of this material is essential for reducing the potential for nuclear proliferation, 
nuclear war, and nuclear terrorism. Unlike plutonium, most of the world’s HEU is in 
military stocks. In addition to its use in nuclear weapons, it is employed to fuel research 
reactors, reactors that produce tritium, and to produce the fuel that powers nuclear 
submarines.
167  
 
It is considerably easier to make a bomb using enriched uranium than using plutonium.
168 
With uranium there is essentially no risk of premature detonation due to neutrons from 
spontaneous fission, as the spontaneous fission rates are far lower than for plutonium. 
Moreover, as fresh HEU is much less radioactive than weapons-grade plutonium, the 
material can be handled with limited risk, even without protective measures or shielding. 
This means that HEU bomb assemblies will be practical, more readily brought together – 
and more likely to function without prior testing. All these factors make HEU a more 
attractive material than plutonium for potential proliferators, particularly those with 
limited access to sophisticated technology.  
 
  39The ease or difficulty of acquiring sufficient quantities of fissile material is a major factor 
in the production of nuclear weapons. All stocks with weapons-usable material are 
attractive targets. This appendix investigates the proliferation potential of HEU – more 
specifically, the proliferation attractiveness of fresh HEU for naval propulsion and the 
possible production of crude nuclear weapons based on this material. The final section of 
this appendix presents a general discussion of the production of crude nuclear weapons. 
For the purpose of this report, a “crude” design means either of the designs successfully 
demonstrated in 1945, i.e. the gun-type and the implosion-type weapon.
169 
 
Proliferation potential of HEU  
 
Shortly after the discovery of nuclear fission in 1939 came the realization that it might be 
possible to make a powerful nuclear explosive by extracting and concentrating the U-235 
from natural uranium. Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is a special mixture of isotopes 
of uranium produced by increasing (enriching) the uranium-235 content of natural 
uranium. An internationally accepted distinction between “low” and “high” enrichment 
has been made at 20% enrichment. This is based on the understanding that it is difficult 
to fashion an explosive nuclear device from uranium enriched to levels of 20% U-235 or 
less.
170 
 
The proliferation potential of a fuel cycle, or its proliferation resistance, is determined by 
the quantity and the quality of the fissile material that could be diverted to military – 
possibly terrorist – uses. According to Galperin et al. (1999) a decisive barrier to 
proliferation should be based on inherent properties of the fuel cycle itself in addition to a 
system of international safeguards measures. The attractiveness of the material, or the 
weapon quality of the fissile material, can be evaluated by considering the following 
properties:  
 
o  critical mass 
o  radioactivity levels and the weapon stability degradation by heat emission  
o  weapon-yield degradation due to pre-initiation caused by spontaneous fission 
neutrons. 
  40 
For uranium, both the radiation levels (and thus heat degradation) and the spontaneous 
fission rate will be very low. Due to the higher rate of spontaneous fissions and stray 
(background) neutrons, all plutonium-weapons will be more vulnerable to pre-ignition 
than weapons based on uranium, a material with a lower neutron background.
171 
Particularly with reactor-grade plutonium, the probability of “pre-detonation” is very 
high, raising the probability that the weapon will blow itself apart at an early stage and 
thus cut short the chain reaction that releases the energy.
172 The reminder of this section 
will focus on the critical mass needed for a crude uranium weapon and the yield likely to 
be produced.  
 
Critical mass 
 
During the fission of fissionable nuclides, vast amounts of energy are released together 
with neutrons and fission products. The neutrons released may induce new fissions in 
other nuclides. A nuclear chain reaction can sustain itself only if there is an assembly of 
fissile material large and dense enough to keep many of the neutrons from escaping. An 
assembly in which, on average, each fission makes one other nucleus spilt, sustaining the 
reaction at a steady state, is called “critical”.  
 
A subcritical assembly would not maintain the chain reaction, and it would die down. By 
contrast, a supercritical (bomb) assembly causes the reaction to grow exponentially, 
releasing large amounts of energy before the weapon finally destroys itself. Weapons 
manufacturers thus need something like a critical mass of the material they intend to use, 
preferably of metal, although oxide powder might be used.  
 
The critical mass varies for different isotopic compositions. For a particular fissile 
material, the amount that constitutes a critical mass can further vary widely depending on 
the enrichment level, the density, and the nature and fractional quantity of any inert 
diluents present (such as oxygen in uranium oxide, uranium-238 in partially enriched 
uranium-235, or chemical impurities).
173 Further, the critical mass is highly dependent 
  41upon the presence of reflectors surrounding the core to return to the system the neutrons 
that would otherwise have been lost.  
 
For higher densities of the material, the critical mass decreases significantly. The bare 
critical masses (without any reflectors) are 52 kg of 94% U-235 metal (density 18.7 g/cc) 
and approximately 110 kg of uranium-oxide enriched to 94% U-235 (density 11.4 
g/cc).
174 Due to the greater cross section of plutonium weapons isotopes, the bare critical 
mass of 239-plutonium metal with a density of 19.9 g/cc is as low as 10 kg.
175 
 
Uranium bombs can be made with a wide range of uranium enrichments, but the mass 
required is greater for lower enrichments. For lower enrichment levels, e.g. 50% enriched 
metal uranium, the bare critical mass is approximately 160 kg – a threefold increase 
compared to the 94% enrichment level, given the material of the same density. Not only 
is very highly enriched uranium preferable for building a compact bomb, less separative 
work is required to obtain a smaller critical mass (roughly 18 kg) at 90% enrichment than 
to obtain a larger critical mass (37 kg) at 60% enrichment.
176 This is why high 
enrichments (and less fissile material) are normally used in uranium bombs. 
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  42Figure A4. Critical mass of uranium metal in the form of spheres enclosed in thick 
neutron reflectors of natural uranium, as function of enrichment levels.
177 
 
The relationship between enrichment levels and critical masses for an assembly with a 
neutron reflector is illustrated in Figure A4. With a good reflector, the critical mass for 
60% enrichment is 22 kg of U-235 and 37 kg of uranium, while only 15 kg of U-235 is 
required at 100% enrichment levels (pure U-235).
178 Thus, reflectors may reduce the 
critical mass by as much as a factor of three. As shown in the Figure, material enriched to 
less than 15–20% U-235 cannot be used in a nuclear weapon, because sufficiently rapid 
supercritical assembly becomes impractical.
179  
 
The simplest type of nuclear explosive, a “gun type”, in which the optimum critical 
configuration is assembled more slowly than in an “implosion type” device, cannot be 
made with plutonium. The Pu-240 content even in weapons-grade plutonium is so large 
that very rapid assembly is necessary to prevent pre-initiation.
180 Gun-type weapons can 
thus be made only with highly enriched uranium, in which spontaneous fission is rare. 
Either material can, however, be used in an implosion device. 
 
Rather than the gun-type assembly, the first Chinese bomb used an implosion design to 
assemble the critical mass of uranium, necessitating considerably less material to make a 
weapon. By comparing the 6 kg fissioned in the Nagasaki bomb with the critical mass of 
10 kg for naked plutonium not surrounded by a neutron reflector, Garwin and Charpak 
(1999) predict that it is possible to manufacture an implosion bomb with 34 kg of 
uranium or less.
181 According to Mark et al. (1987), 25 kg of very highly enriched 
uranium would be needed for an implosion-type HEU weapon.
182 
 
The minimum quantities of approximately 25 kg indicated are well in accordance with 
the Significant Quantities used by the IAEA.
183 However, these significant quantities 
have been criticized for being too large, as nuclear fission weapons could reportedly be 
produced with as low as 2.5 kg to 8 kg of HEU, depending on the sophistication of the 
weapon design.
184 
  43 
Weapon yield 
 
The energy yield of nuclear weapons is commonly expressed in kilotons (kt) or megatons 
(Mt) of TNT equivalent. Yield will depend on the quantity of fissile material available, 
and, more importantly, on the ability of the nuclear device to maintain a supercritical 
configuration. The energy output can be devastating even in crude nuclear weapons: the 
weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki produced yields more than 1000 times the 
biggest conventional bomb ever deployed in warfare.
185  
 
Even if pre-ignition in a simple nuclear device similar to the Nagasaki bomb occurs at the 
worst possible moment, when the material first become compressed enough to sustain a 
chain reaction, the explosive yield will be in the order of one or a few kilotons.
186 While 
this is referred to as a “fizzle yield”, a 1-kiloton bomb would still have a radius of 
destruction of roughly one-third that of the Hiroshima weapon, making it a potentially 
fearsome explosive. 
 
The complete fission of U-235 in a reactor releases 8.2 x 10
13 J/kg.
187 About 85% of the 
energy comes from the fission fragments themselves and 5% from prompt neutron and 
gamma rays. The complete fission of 1 kg of U-235 would give a prompt explosive yield 
of about 7 x 10
13 J/kg, or approximately 17 kt. The actual yield of nuclear weapons is less 
than 17 kt/kg, because a bomb will disassemble without complete fissioning of all the 
material. More poorly assembled nuclear devices will produce a smaller yield, because 
the chain reaction will be aborted as the system rapidly expands. Nevertheless, they may 
produce a significant radiation burst.  
 
The early plutonium bombs had efficiency under 20%, and this figure probably is even 
lower for crude uranium bombs. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima had a yield of 
approximately 15 kt, but only some 700 g of the total of 60 kg of uranium actually 
fissioned, indicating an efficiency of a little more than 1%. A complete fissioning of 6 kg 
of HEU will produce slightly above 100 kt, so 1% efficiency would give a yield of 
approximately 1 kt. This makes feasible the estimates of Cochran and Paine (1995), 
  44indicating that 8 kg of HEU, or as low as 2.5 kg for more sophisticated weapons, is 
sufficient to produce a yield of 1 kiloton.  
 
Part of the energy from the explosives compressing the fissile material will heat the 
device and the surroundings. The yields produced will depend on how close to the fissile 
material is to the critical mass prior to the compression, especially for the less 
compressible oxide material. This means that the willingness of perpetrators to risk 
potential criticality incidents while preparing the device will be an important factor in 
determining the yield produced.  
  
Crude nuclear weapon production 
 
 
Expert opinion differs on the ease of building a clandestine nuclear explosive outside the 
purview of a traditional state weapons program. The following discussion will argue that 
such production is feasible. Due to the anticipated limited technical skills of potential 
would-be-nuclear-terrorists, only crude nuclear weapon designs will be investigated here. 
 
The primary restraining factor in the production of clandestine nuclear weapons is likely 
to be the difficulty of access to highly enriched uranium or plutonium, the essential 
ingredients of such weapons. The vast quantities of fissile material produced during the 
Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union may increase the availability of the 
weapons-usable material. Thus, while the primary barrier may be crumbling, the 
importance of other barriers against clandestine production and deployment may 
increase.  
 
The fact that the most substantial problem of a potential bomb-maker is to acquire 
sufficient amounts of weapons-usable nuclear material has been underlined by John 
Foster, former director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 
  
  45the only difficult part of making a fission bomb of some sort is the 
preparation of a supply of fissionable material of adequate purity: the 
design of the bomb it self is relatively easy….
188 
 
Luis W. Alvarez, a prominent nuclear weapon scientist in the Manhattan Project, has 
emphasized the simplicity of constructing a nuclear explosive with highly enriched 
uranium:
 189 
 
With modern weapons-grade uranium, the background neutron rate is so 
low that terrorists, if they have such material, would have a good chance 
of setting of a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the 
material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated 
HEU is at hand it’s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion... even a 
high school kid could make a bomb in short order. 
 
While Alvarez does not specify the meaning of “high-yield” explosion, it is probable that 
a yield in the kiloton range could be established. Thus, the difficulty of designing and 
fabricating a nuclear weapon from either highly enriched uranium or plutonium may 
often seem exaggerated. A competent group of nuclear physicists and electronic and 
explosive engineers would have little difficulty in designing and constructing such a 
weapon from scratch. Moreover, they would not need access to any classified 
information.
190  
 
The nuclear weapons developed in the mid 1940s then represented the “state of the art” in 
technical engineering and nature science. Today these weapons are regarded as both 
primitive and outdated. Though no detailed descriptions of nuclear weapons have been 
released publicly, the principles behind the first fission explosions are widely known and 
available from the scientific literature and from declassified U.S. documents. Also in the 
swarm of information on the Internet, description and background information on crude 
nuclear weapon production can be found.
191  
 
  46The simplicity of the gun-type design makes it probable that a workable uranium bomb 
could be produced without any testing. “Little Boy”, the HEU bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima, was triggered by a simple “gun” mechanism. A small, slug-shaped piece of 
uranium was fired down a barrel into a larger, cup-shaped piece of HEU, and the weapon 
was used without previous testing.
192 And yet this elementary design generated a 
destructive force of about 15 kilotons — the equivalent of 15,000 tons of TNT.  
In 1993 South Africa surprised the world by announcing that the country’s clandestine 
production of nuclear weapons had ceased, that the weapons had been dismantled and 
that the country was ready to submit all former weapons activities to the control of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. Despite the international embargo posed on the 
apartheid regime, six nuclear weapons had been produced during a period of four years. 
These weapons, all developed without any testing, were of the gun-type design. On 
average each weapon contained about 55 kg of uranium enriched to 94% U-235.
193 
 
The fact that terrorists may not have to heed many of the restrictions and problems of 
states’ nuclear weapon programs may further increase the risk of the sub-national 
production of clandestine nuclear weapons. First, the requirement of knowing the precise 
yields of the weapons will be superfluous for terrorists. While covert attackers would 
want predictable weapons-effects, less precision is required than for state military 
purposes.
194 Further, terrorists will not have to meet the extremely stringent specifications 
and tolerance required for military weapons production.
195 State military weapons must, 
to a much larger extent than terrorist weapons, be reliable, safe and optimal. That is, 
when the weapons are used, they must function with optimal yields with the minimal 
impact of possible effects of aging or other deteriorating factors, e.g. heat deterioration. 
Moreover, during long-term storage, state weapons must remain safe and secure, to guard 
against unintentional or unauthorized detonation.  
 
Weapons for military uses are needed in large numbers, and they must be delivered by 
conventional military means (missiles, mortars etc.). Due to their limited size and weight, 
crude nuclear weapons will easily fit into a van, or even automobiles, for subsequent 
detonation in densely populated areas. Other non-military means of delivery could be 
  47trucks or ships in harbors. Crude nuclear weapons will be produced in limited numbers, 
reducing the costs of manufacture and maintenance. Finally, while state nuclear weapon 
programs are usually supported by a large infrastructure and perhaps reprocessing 
facilities for the separation of fissile weapons material, sub-national groups will normally 
rely on smaller programs and most probably externally acquired weapons-usable 
material.
196 It is also possible that “rogue” governments unwilling to use weapons of 
mass destruction due to fear of retaliation could readily supply the raw material or the 
finished product to terrorists – whether by political design or for commercial gain.
197  
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Appendix II. 
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for Russia. See e.g. the statement of Gottemoeller (2000).  
10 Albright et al. (1997), pp. 6–7.  
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12 Bunn (2000), p.17.  
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14 DOE (1997), p. 6 & p. 21.  
15 The safeguards of the Non-Proliferation Treaty are meant to verify compliance with treaty by providing 
for “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear 
activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for the purposes 
unknown, and the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection”. From IAEA INFCIRC/153, 
article 28. The production of HEU and plutonium for use in weapons and other national defense purposes 
requires many of the same steps as those involved in the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, and many of the same 
government facilities constructed for military programs have been used to produce fuel for civilian nuclear-
power reactors. The relationship between the civilian and military fuel cycles has prompted international 
concerns that nuclear material in the civilian sector could be used for manufacturing nuclear weapons. To 
counter the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation, 185 countries have agreed to implement the nuclear-
material safeguards developed and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA’s 
safeguards involve accounting and verification procedures designed to detect unauthorized diversions of 
nuclear material that could occur in the commercial fuel cycle. To further expand nuclear safeguards, the   56
                                                                                                                                                 
United States has voluntarily agreed to allow the IAEA to inspect certain inventories of U.S. HEU and 
plutonium no longer needed for national defense purposes. From DOE/EIA (1998), p. 8. 
16 The Non-Proliferation Treaty, article III.  
17 Mochiji et al. (1999), p. 47. 
18 CSIS (2000), p. 53. 
19 Ibid, p. 54.  
20 Unfortunately, many good political intentions have stranded before their practical implementation. For an 
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21 Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p.3. 
22 In the area of mutual reciprocal inspections (MRI), the proposed activity was to have U.S. and Russian 
technical experts develop non-intrusive techniques of confirming that, at the end of the dismantlement 
process, a declared fissile material container contains a weapons-grade plutonium or highly-enriched 
uranium (HEU) object the shape and mass of which (in the case of a warhead pit) are consistent with those 
of a warhead component. During 1994 and 1995, Russian and U.S. experts developed and demonstrated 
some promising MRI techniques, but no consensus was reached on the scope of fissile material 
measurements or specific MRI procedures. Bukharin & Luongo (1999), p.3. 
23 Relating to the “transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic 
nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures, to promote the 
irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads.” 
However, according to Bukharin & Luongo (1999), in the U.S. bureaucracy this statement was met with 
some confusion as to its actual meaning, and resistance to warhead transparency persisted in some portions 
of Russia's bureaucracy. 
24 DOE (1996). 
25 In February 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Hazel O’Leary, announced that the United States would 
produce a report detailing the production, use, disposition and inventories of HEU covering the past 50 
years. She said the report would be completed in about one year. As of early 2002, the HEU report has still 
not materialized.  
26 DOE (1996), p. 5. After considering the arguments for the maintenance of previous levels of 
confidentiality about the stocks of fissile material required for national security reasons, the British 
government in June 1988 concluded that there was no longer a need for complete confidentiality about 
these stocks, and declared their total stockpiles of plutonium and uranium held outside international 
safeguards. Moreover, a significant amount (4.4 tons of plutonium and over 9.0 tons of enriched uranium) 
of the stock has been made available for IAEA/Euroatom safeguards. From INFCIRC/570 Attachment. 
“United Kingdom Fissile Material Transparency, Safeguards and Irreversibility initiatives”. 
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30 Mochiji et al. (1999), p. 48. 
31 France and China use LEU in their submarines.  
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